How the Persistence of Crony Capitalism Paved the Way for Authoritarian Nostalgia in Post-Arab Spring Tunisia
Introduction
As authoritarianism appears to be on a rise globally, the phenomenon of democratic backsliding, which is particularly evident in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, has attracted increasing scholarly attention (Topak et al., 2022: 21). Tunisia, once considered the sole 'democratic success story' of the 2011 Arab Uprisings and frequently described as the ‘Tunisian exception,’ saw its democratic norms erode following Presidents Saied’s “extraordinary measures” in July 2021 (Cimini, 2022: 276). Consequently, it constitutes one of the most researched cases of this phenomenon, with analysts providing various explanations for the widespread public support for the 2021 backsliding. While many scholarly explanations focus solely on institutional flaws, elite polarisation or populist rhetoric, this study argues that public support for authoritarianism stems mainly from the persistence of crony capitalism after 2011. Therefore, before restoring processes such as holding elections, it is necessary to address these crony mechanisms to reestablish Tunisia’s democratic norms.
More specifically, the study is centered around the following argument: the persistence of crony capitalist networks after 2011, which were sustained through Ennahda’s reconciliation with Ben Ali era’s business elites, clientelist governance and monopoly power, undermined public trust in democratic institutions. In the perceptions of Tunisians, democracy became progressively more linked to corruption and inequality as economic grievances grew, leading to the phenomenon of authoritarian nostalgia. Saied instrumentalized this sentiment to legitimise his self-coup in 2021, presenting it as a populist mobilisation against these established crony structures. Therefore, it is unlikely that policy recommendations that merely concentrate on holding elections and restoring democratic procedures will be successful unless they also eliminate the monopolistic and clientelist structures that led to the erosion of democratic norms.
Placing this sociological mechanism at the heart of the argument demonstrates how economic structures and everyday social realities were combined to produce political outcomes in post-2011 Tunisia. Citizens developed grievances linked to their everyday encounters with favoritism and clientelism, which eventually led to moral judgments about the legitimacy of democratic institutions. (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025: 2; Souilmi, 2023: 1434-35). Therefore, approaching this issue requires a multidisciplinary lens. While Political Economy provides an explanation of how elite resource capture persisted after 2011, Political Science describes how elite bargains, and the expansion of executive power sustained this system. Finally, sociology and anthropology offer a clarification of how public complaints resulting from these structures paved the way for the emergence of authoritarian nostalgia and support for anti-democratic measures (Cimini, 2022: 279, 285; Blanc, 2025: 207, 215).
Before proceeding to the analysis of the Tunisian case, it is essential to examine the framework of crony capitalism. Close, frequently corrupt, ties between businesses and political leaders are a key characteristic of this phenomenon (Suryawanshi, 2025: 1). In this context, implied assurances, and preferential treatment for companies with close political ties blur the line between the state and favored corporations (Suryawanshi, 2025: 2). Similarly, economist Stephen Haber condemns crony capitalism, describing it as a system in which favors of substantial economic value are granted to individuals with close ties to the ruling class (Dragos & Tarko, 2024: 159). These individuals are able to derive benefits from such privileges that exceed what would be plausible in a market characterised by genuine competition (Dragos & Tarko, 2024: 159).
Furthermore, Suryawanshi describes crony capitalism as a form of 'rent-seeking society', wherein 'rent-seeking' is viewed as the pursuit of financial gain through influencing the political landscape, as opposed to creating prosperity through innovation and manufacturing (2025: 2). Dragos & Tarko emphasize how government actions, including selective subsidies, monopoly contracts and insulation from global competition, contribute to this occurrence (2014: 158). Therefore, crony capitalism compounds inequality and produces a vicious circle of corruption by consolidating money and power in the hands of selected individuals (Suryawanshi, 2025: 1).
As will be analysed in this study, the majority of the aforementioned characteristics of Crony Capitalism have been identified in post-2011 Tunisia. Their presence caused the democratic foundation of the country to erode. This decline is a common effect of crony capitalism, frequently causing the public to view the system as unjust and biased (Dragos & Tarko, 2014: 159, Suryawanshi, 2025: 3). In this context, Saied invoced Article 80 of the 2014 constitution, to suspend parliament and to dismiss the Prime Minister (Souilmi, 2023: 1426; Blackman, 2024: 154). Specifically, Saied employed a populist rhetoric to justify his actions, focusing on anti-corruption and portraying the self-coup as a state defensive against the governing political class (Ridge, 2022: 2). To make his 'extraordinary measures' appear like justifiable solutions to the current crony mechanisms, rather than violations of democratic norms, he strategically targeted monopolies and portrayed elites as traitors (Ridge, 2022; 2,5; Souilmi, 2023: 1433). His narrative of being a 'clean' outsider and a remedy for crony rent-seeking structures associated with a dissatisfied population that already viewed democratic institutions as being involved in economic exploitation and crony activities (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025: 16; Souilmi, 2023: 1436).
Based on the above, the study aims to address the following Research Question: 'How did the persistence of crony capitalist practices in post-2011 Tunisia contribute to undermining democratic legitimacy and creating authoritarian nostalgia?' In the subsequent sections, the study examines the interrelated crony processes that collectively contributed to transforming economic complaints into moral criticisms of the political system, ultimately undermining democratic legitimacy.
How elite pacts, clientism and monopolies led post-2011 Tunisia to lose its democratic promise
Crony Capitalism’s persistence in Tunisia’s post-2011 reality should not be perceived as a set of distinct corrupt practices, but rather as a long-standing political and economic structure that ultimately influenced public perceptions of democracy. As previously stated, the continued existence of those structures led to the erosion of the country’s democratic foundation. This decline constitutes a common effect of Crony Capitalism, frequently leading to the public viewing the system as unjust and biased (Dragos & Tarko, 2014: 159; Suryawanshi, 2025: 3). For the analytical purposes of this study, the presence of characteristics of Crony Capitalism in post-revolutionary Tunisia will be separated into three interconnected categories.
- Elite continuity and elite pacts
- Clientelism and state favoritism
- Concentration of economic rents in monopolies and politically connected firms
These crony structures collectively operated to undermine democratic legitimacy by turning economic concerns into a moral critique of the political system. Each of them had a significant impact on the way ordinary Tunisians viewed the post-revolutionary order and rendered them vulnerable to populist, anti-elite appeals.
To begin with, the pre-2011 crony structures were maintained through elite continuity and elite pacts, allowing for politics to be perceived as exploitation rather than genuine representation. Despite political promises and popular demand for change, many governing actors and practices remained unchanged following the 2011 revolution (Blanc, 2025: 212). Former regime leaders and elites who were tied to them were given de facto amnesty, significantly undermining the revolution’s demands for distribution and conventional justice (Cimini, 2022: 289; Blanc, 2025: 214). This was reinforced through the rejection of lustration and the introduction of executive reconciliation regulations (Cimini, 2022: 289).
Ennahda’s strategic shift towards the so-called 'politics of consensus' (tawafuq) further exemplifies the aforementioned view (Blanc, 2025: 207). While this strategy is best known for leading to the party’s coalition with its longtime opponent, Nidaa Tunès, following the latter’s victory in the 2014 parliamentary elections, it also involved Ennahda forming informal partnerships with business-linked parties, such as Qalb Tunès and the UPL. (Blanc, 2025: 215, 2022). Therefore, Ennahda’s informal coalitions, which were part of a broader political survival tactic, resulted in opportunistic elite agreements that stalled, rather than settled, disputes over economic privilege.
In this context, citizens experienced legislative and executive compromises that maintained existing 'rents' and reintegrated previous regime personnel (Cimini, 2022: 289). This framework appeared to sustain, rather than dismantle established economic privileges (Blanc, 2025: 216). As a result, Tunisians increasingly came to view elections and pluralism as another means through which elites reproduced their advantages, ultimately contributing to widespread popular support for President Saied’s 2021 self-coup (Blanc, 2025: 215).
Suryawanshi’s sociological approach to the consequences of crony capitalism further strengthens this view. In particular, he argues that individuals lose faith in government institutions when they observe favoritism and corruption, such as the unequal application of laws or policies shaped by lobbying efforts, leading them to perceive the system as rigged (Suryawanshi, 2025: 3). The erosion of trust directly affects the political system, as it increases public receptiveness to actors who claim that existing institutions are unable to ensure justice and redistribution (Dragos & Tarko, 2014: 170; Suryawanshi, 2025: 3). This is precisely what occurred in Tunisia following the 2011 Arab Uprisings. The belief that political change did not alter patterns of economic distributions, reflected in elite continuity, created a challenge of trust for representative institutions.
In addition to elite pacts, clientelism and state favoritism were also major factors in Tunisia’s post-2011 crony reality. As will be discussed in this section, they operated at both macro and micro levels to link party patronage networks to the citizens’ economic well-being.
Souilmi’s ethnographic research at a rural Tunisian community exemplifies this dynamic. In particular, her study demonstrates how contracts, public sector employment, and stipends were distributed according to party affiliations and short-term clientelist exchanges during election periods (Souilmi, 2023: 1434-35). In this context, elections began to be viewed as procurement events rather than civic affairs, especially when state employment programs, such as the Hadhira scheme, and positions in institutions such as election authorities became tools for private advantage (Souilmi, 2023: 1434, 1439). At a macro level, despite the passage of liberalisation and anti-monopoly regulations by post-2011 leaderships, such as Law No. 36/ 2015 for the reorganization of competition and prices, these initiatives failed to translate into meaningful reform (Blanc, 2025: 222). Judicial proceedings frequently stalled, postponing implementation orders and extending existing oligopolistic crony networks (Blanc, 2025: 222).
Consequently, the Tunisian economic landscape became characterised by preferential access to credit, selective grants, and impunity for politically connected firms (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025: 7, 15). This environment fundamentally undermined the perceived value of democracy, as citizens increasingly concluded that the system rewarded political patronage rather than effort or competence (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025: 7, 15).
Examining the prevalence of clientelism in post-revolutionary Tunisia is essential for understanding how democratic norms have eroded. As demonstrated by Souilmi’s study, citizens begin to expect favorable treatment rather than public services when they observe that the state provides benefits exclusively through political connections (2023: 1435-36). Consequently, clientelism created and legitimised a social logic that opposed the idea that equitable distribution would arise from democracy and pluralistic competition.
The existing literature argues that this environment makes individuals and organisations vulnerable to populist movements and anti-establishment ideas, as populism provides a flexible ideological tool that justifies government actions while articulating the interests of the population against the elites (Dragos & Tarko, 2014; Suryawanshi, 2025: 3). In return for promises of prosperity and equitable distribution, people may decide to accept the undermining of constitutional checks and balances on political authority, which might drive groups to support authoritarian solutions (Dragos & Tarko, 2014: 171). Therefore, this factor helps explain the massive support for President Saied’s 'extraordinary measures.'
The final aspect of crony capitalism in post-revolutionary Tunisia relates to concentrated rents and monopoly power, which further exacerbated redistributive grievances and strengthened the link between democracy and economic failure.
The existing literature documents how the disproportionate advantage of powerful actors through subsidies and public spending prevented the fulfillment of fundamental demands from the 2011 uprisings, notably combating regional inequality and creating job positions for youth and university graduates (Gabsi & Sarihan, 2025: 14,17; Blanc, 2025: 221). For instance, Gabsi and Sarihan note that in 2017, 89% of the Tunisian population believed that corruption was more pervasive than before the revolution (2025: 17). Furthermore, Ridge emphasises rising financial instability, reporting that over 60% of Tunisian families found their incomes insufficient to cover basic expenses between 2018 and 2021 (2022: 4). Consequently, these factors created the impression that democracy was failing to provide basic economic security.
In this context, President Saied successfully exploited the situation, arguing that monopolies could only be dismantled by a strong, centralised leadership capable of restoring 'order' and efficiency (Cimini, 2022: 179). For citizens for whom formal democratic processes had resulted in stagnation rather than redistribution, this argument was particularly persuasive (Souilmi, 2023: 1437). Therefore, populist and anti-establishment forces were able to effectively capitalise on the link between monopolistic power and democratic underperformance.
Conclusions
This study demonstrated that authoritarian nostalgia, which eventually led to widespread public support for the 2021 democratic backsliding in Tunisia, was not solely the result of populist rhetoric or institutional failure. Rather, it was rooted in the persistence of crony capitalism in the country’s political and economic landscape, which transformed economic grievances into a moral critique of democracy.
Empirically, crony mechanisms, including elite continuity, clientelism and concentrated rents preserved existing monopolies and failed to meet the revolution’s demands for redistribution and equality. Instead, these structures contributed to rising perceptions of corruption, unemployment, and household poverty. Consequently, many ordinary Tunisians came to perceive democracy as a mechanism that shielded elite corruption rather than one that promoted equitable distribution. This is precisely the point at which populist discourse became effective. The study shows how these public attitudes made Saied’s moral language, which was centered on strongman leadership and anti-elite claims, persuasive, ultimately fueling the phenomenon of authoritarian nostalgia.
Thus, policy proposals that focus solely on restoring democratic procedures and holding elections are unlikely to succeed unless they simultaneously adress the crony monopolistic and clientelist structures that undermined democratic norms. Therefore, dismantling these crony mechanisms is essential for the restoration of enduring democratic legitimacy and processes in Tunisia.
References
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